Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
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Publication:2388760
DOI10.1007/s003550050170zbMath1069.91560OpenAlexW2144679114MaRDI QIDQ2388760
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050170
Related Items (7)
Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems ⋮ Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras ⋮ Stable preference aggregation with infinite population ⋮ An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems ⋮ A characterization of the plurality rule ⋮ Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
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