A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule
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Publication:2388761
DOI10.1007/s003550050171zbMath1069.91538OpenAlexW2095555853MaRDI QIDQ2388761
Donald G. Saari, Vincent R. Merlin
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050171
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