Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments

DOI10.1007/s003550000059zbMath1069.91503OpenAlexW2117657913MaRDI QIDQ2388785

Michel Le Breton, John Duggan

Publication date: 20 September 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000059

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (11)

Extending tournament solutions ⋮ A new old solution for weak tournaments ⋮ Uncovered sets ⋮ Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items ⋮ A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets ⋮ Preference-based choice functions: a generalized approach ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ An ordinal minimax theorem ⋮ The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems ⋮ Choosing from a weighted tournament ⋮ Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections

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