Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference

DOI10.1007/s003550000071zbMath1069.91528OpenAlexW2007815148MaRDI QIDQ2388796

Fabrice Valognes, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 20 September 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000071

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention ⋮ The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner ⋮ The uncovered set and indifference in spatial models: a fuzzy set approach ⋮ The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes ⋮ The Impact of Forcing Preference Rankings When Indifference Exists ⋮ On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules ⋮ On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

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