Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information

DOI10.1007/PL00007181zbMath1069.91510OpenAlexW2083666617MaRDI QIDQ2388802

John H. Nachbar

Publication date: 20 September 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00007181

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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