An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2388822
DOI10.1007/s003550100151zbMath1069.91542OpenAlexW2112785591MaRDI QIDQ2388822
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100151
Related Items
The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences, On the manipulability of the fuzzy social choice functions, On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties, Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning, Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions, Non-manipulability vs. individual rationality in a permit sharing problem, Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study, Dynamically consistent voting rules, The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control, The division problem with voluntary participation, Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule, Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness, Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects, Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules, Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules, Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules, ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS, Bribe-proof rules in the division problem, Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication, Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good, Opinion formation games with aggregation and negative influence, Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money, Voting by committees under constraints, Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies, On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness, Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies, Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences, Unnamed Item, Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods, Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach, The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity, Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains, Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size, Unnamed Item, Social Choice Theory, Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
