A crash course in implementation theory
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2388823
DOI10.1007/s003550100152zbMath1069.91557OpenAlexW1977483205MaRDI QIDQ2388823
Publication date: 20 September 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79990/
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