Commitment and observability in a contracting environment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.08.003zbMath1165.91308OpenAlexW2087700196MaRDI QIDQ2389297

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 15 July 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

mixed strategiescommitmentimperfect observationpricing games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Commitment and observability in a contracting environment ⋮ Games played in a contracting environment ⋮ Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader

Cites Work

• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly
• Games played in a contracting environment
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Commitment and observability in games
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE

This page was built for publication: Commitment and observability in a contracting environment