Auctions in which losers set the price

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.006zbMath1165.91386OpenAlexW2102467769MaRDI QIDQ2389310

Ilia Tsetlin, Claudio Mezzetti

Publication date: 15 July 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269843/files/twerp_845.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsrationingEnglish auctionrobust mechanism designsecond-price auctionaffiliated values\(k\)th price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction