Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games
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Publication:2389314
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.004zbMath1165.91338OpenAlexW2091537558MaRDI QIDQ2389314
Publication date: 15 July 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.004
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The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes ⋮ Costly network formation and regular equilibria ⋮ Network formation and pairwise stability: a new oddness theorem
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