A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
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Publication:2389675
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2008.05.003zbMath1184.91029OpenAlexW2436401953WikidataQ57377393 ScholiaQ57377393MaRDI QIDQ2389675
Shaheen S. Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R. Jennings
Publication date: 17 July 2009
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/265802/1/aij08.pdf
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Cooperative games (91A12) Approximation algorithms (68W25)
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