Evaluation of Banzhaf index with restrictions on coalitions formation

DOI10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.017zbMath1187.91021OpenAlexW1996745495MaRDI QIDQ2389794

Vyacheslav Yakuba

Publication date: 18 July 2009

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.017

zbMATH Keywords

generating functionsBanzhaf indexpower in groupsrestrictions on coalition formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (5)

Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players ⋮ An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players ⋮ Generating Functions of Weighted Voting Games, MacMahon’s Partition Analysis, and Clifford Algebras ⋮ On calculation of the power indices with allowance for the agent preferences ⋮ Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On a classification of independence systems
• Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently

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