Gains from manipulating social choice rules

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0380-6zbMath1173.91361OpenAlexW2146235467MaRDI QIDQ2391056

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 24 July 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0380-6

zbMATH Keywords

scoring rulesmanipulationcoringGibbard-Satterthwaite

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules ⋮ Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures ⋮ The structure of unstable power mechanisms ⋮ Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem ⋮ The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity ⋮ The strategic sincerity of approval voting ⋮ On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules ⋮ Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information ⋮ Social Choice Theory

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
• A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
• Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes

This page was built for publication: Gains from manipulating social choice rules