On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.001zbMath1400.91263OpenAlexW2292459874MaRDI QIDQ2397642

Christian Trudeau, Juan J. Vidal-Puga

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/1505.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

reduced gamefolk solutionextreme core allocationsBird solutioncycle-complete solutionminimal cost spanning tree problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (8)

Comments on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities ⋮ On a class of vertices of the core ⋮ Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value ⋮ One-way and two-way cost allocation in hub network problems ⋮ Minimum cost spanning tree problems as value sharing problems ⋮ Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems ⋮ A non-cooperative game theory approach to cost sharing in networks ⋮ A cost sharing example in which subsidies are necessary for stability

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