Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
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Publication:2397662
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-1008-6zbMath1392.91103OpenAlexW2030626382WikidataQ59480946 ScholiaQ59480946MaRDI QIDQ2397662
Seyed Hossein Naeemi, Rudolf Müller, André Berger
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-016-1008-6
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (2)
The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions ⋮ Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
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