Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0535-9zbMath1398.91027arXiv1605.01236OpenAlexW2345670173MaRDI QIDQ2398190

Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses

Publication date: 15 August 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.01236

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge of rationalitysequential equilibriumperfect equilibriumquasi-perfect equilibriumcharacterizing solution concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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