Identification of first-price auctions with non-equilibrium beliefs: a measurement error approach

DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.014zbMath1390.91138OpenAlexW2735443575MaRDI QIDQ2399544

Yonghong An

Publication date: 24 August 2017

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2017.06.014

zbMATH Keywords

nonparametric estimationfirst-price auctionsnonparametric identificationmeasurement error modelsasymmetric value distributionsnon-equilibrium beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Nonparametric estimation (62G05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Informed speculation with k-level reasoning, Measurement error models: editors' introduction, Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance, Econometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefs, Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction, Identification of auction models using order statistics, Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion, Dynamic decisions under subjective expectations: a structural analysis

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Identification and estimation of nonlinear models with misclassification error using instrumental variables: a general solution
• Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable
• English auctions with resale: an experimental study
• Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: a misclassification approach
• Asymptotic distribution of normalized maximum under finite mixture models
• On the persistence of strategic sophistication
• Finite mixture models and model-based clustering
• Nonparametric estimation of the measurement error model using multiple indicators.
• On kernel density estimation near endpoints
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
• Nonparametric analysis of covariance.
• Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
• On extremes of mixtures of distributions
• Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders
• Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
• Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study
• TESTS OF RANK
• Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• On boundary estimation
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Instrumental Variable Treatment of Nonclassical Measurement Error Models
• Identification of Standard Auction Models
• Microeconometrics