Security levels in steganography -- insecurity does not imply detectability

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2017.06.007zbMath1372.68089OpenAlexW2692044285WikidataQ115036513 ScholiaQ115036513MaRDI QIDQ2401760

Maciej Liśkiewicz, Ulrich Wölfel, K. Ruediger Reischuk

Publication date: 5 September 2017

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2017.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

provable securitysteganographydistribution learningcovertext channels

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (1)

On the universal steganography of optimal rate

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