Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.003zbMath1400.91099OpenAlexW3124447003MaRDI QIDQ2402057

Chong Huang

Publication date: 6 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

learningspeculative attackscoordinationreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Global manipulation by local obfuscation ⋮ Regime change games with an active defender

Cites Work

• Dynamic coordination with individual learning
• Reputation and exogenous private learning
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks

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