Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
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Publication:2402063
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.06.006zbMath1400.91230OpenAlexW2645394978MaRDI QIDQ2402063
Romans Pancs, Arina Nikandrova
Publication date: 6 September 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/19020/1/Correlated%20Search%20G39.pdf
Related Items (2)
Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning ⋮ Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
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