Two-sided matching with indifferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.07.002zbMath1400.91373OpenAlexW2736806615MaRDI QIDQ2402065

Aytek Erdil, Haluk İ. Ergin

Publication date: 6 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/269832

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matchingmatching with indifferencesefficient and stable matchingmatching with ties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences ⋮ Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences ⋮ Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences ⋮ A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list ⋮ Marriage market with indifferences: a linear programming approach ⋮ School choice with costly information acquisition ⋮ Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Efficient assignment respecting priorities ⋮ Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences ⋮ Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets ⋮ Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity ⋮ Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences ⋮ Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints ⋮ College admissions with tuition transfers ⋮ A New Approach to the Pareto Stable Matching Problem ⋮ Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies

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