A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2017.02.036zbMath1370.92119OpenAlexW2594888622WikidataQ47338421 ScholiaQ47338421MaRDI QIDQ2402502

Yi Tao, Cong Li, Jie-Ru Yu, Shichang Wang, Song-Jia Fan, Bo-Yu Zhang, Xiu-Deng Zheng

Publication date: 8 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.036

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of cooperationlong-term stable coexistence of cooperation and defectionout-for-tat (OFT)tit-for-tat (TFT)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (14)

Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game ⋮ The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence ⋮ Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance ⋮ Evolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option ⋮ Heterogeneous cooperative belief for social dilemma in multi-agent system ⋮ Asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics based on individuals' own volition ⋮ Optimal tag-based cooperation control for the ``prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma ⋮ The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
• Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
• Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
• Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Paradox of the evolution of communication and of social interactivity.
• The Calculus of Selfishness

This page was built for publication: A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game