Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2017.03.006zbMath1371.91017OpenAlexW2592797374WikidataQ47335924 ScholiaQ47335924MaRDI QIDQ2402516

Yuying Zhu, Jianlei Zhang, Chunyan Zhang, Zeng-Qiang Chen

Publication date: 8 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryreplicator dynamicscooperationpunishment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Cluster evolution in public goods game with fairness mechanism ⋮ The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in division of labor games on cycle networks ⋮ Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games ⋮ Equilibrium analysis and incentive-based control of the anticoordinating networked game dynamics

Cites Work

• Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games?
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors
• Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games

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