Epistemic democracy with correlated voters
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Publication:2402815
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.06.001zbMath1394.91130OpenAlexW2280285321MaRDI QIDQ2402815
Publication date: 14 September 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69546/1/MPRA_paper_69546.pdf
Related Items (8)
Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence ⋮ The importance of expertise in group decisions ⋮ Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ Voter conformism and inefficient policies ⋮ Weighted representative democracy ⋮ The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework ⋮ Majority rule in the absence of a majority ⋮ On the probability of the Condorcet jury theorem or the miracle of aggregation
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