Epistemic democracy with correlated voters

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.06.001zbMath1394.91130OpenAlexW2280285321MaRDI QIDQ2402815

Marcus Pivato

Publication date: 14 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69546/1/MPRA_paper_69546.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

social networkdeliberationCondorcet jury theoremwisdom of crowdsDeGrootepistemic social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence ⋮ The importance of expertise in group decisions ⋮ Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ Voter conformism and inefficient policies ⋮ Weighted representative democracy ⋮ The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework ⋮ Majority rule in the absence of a majority ⋮ On the probability of the Condorcet jury theorem or the miracle of aggregation

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