Myopic versus far-sighted behaviors in dynamic supply chain coordination through advertising with reference price effect
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Publication:2403865
DOI10.1155/2017/9759561zbMath1370.90134OpenAlexW2616079165WikidataQ59143363 ScholiaQ59143363MaRDI QIDQ2403865
Publication date: 12 September 2017
Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/9759561
Related Items (3)
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Cites Work
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- Optimal control and differential games. Essays in honour of Steffen Jørgensen. Workshop held in September 2002.
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- Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-retailer channel
- Retail promotions with negative brand image effects: Is cooperation possible?
- Price coordination in distribution channels: a dynamic perspective
- Dynamic Pricing with Loss-Averse Consumers and Peak-End Anchoring
- A dynamic advertising model with reference price effect
- Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects
- Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects
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