Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation

DOI10.1007/s11238-016-9546-zzbMath1378.91048OpenAlexW2339078318MaRDI QIDQ2404217

Achim Wambach, Philippe Gillen, Alexander Rasch, Peter Werner

Publication date: 18 September 2017

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9546-z

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityprocurementmulti-unit auctionreverse Dutch auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
• The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions
• English auctions with resale: an experimental study
• On the persistence of strategic sophistication
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
• Collusion without conspiracy: An experimental study of one-sided auctions
• Clock games: theory and experiments
• Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment
• On the strictly descending multi-unit auction
• The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas
• Bertrand colludes more than Cournot
• Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games
• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative “Dutch” Auctions
• Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in Experimental Markets
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

This page was built for publication: Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation