Stable matching with network externalities
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Publication:2408103
DOI10.1007/s00453-016-0197-9zbMath1378.91107OpenAlexW2477517072MaRDI QIDQ2408103
Elliot Anshelevich, Onkar Bhardwaj, Martin Hoefer
Publication date: 9 October 2017
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-016-0197-9
altruismstable matchingprice of anarchyprice of stabilityfractional matchingfriendshippairwise equilibrium
Games involving graphs (91A43) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (2)
Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints ⋮ Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
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