Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
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Publication:2409677
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2017.04.006zbMath1425.91346OpenAlexW2608462625MaRDI QIDQ2409677
Makoto Yokoo, Takamasa Suzuki, Chia-Ling Hsu, Naoto Hamada, Suguru Ueda, Ryoji Kurata
Publication date: 13 October 2017
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2017.04.006
market designstrategy-proofnessschool choicetop trading cycles mechanismmatching theorydeferred acceptance mechanismminimum quotas
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