Balanced ranking mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.002zbMath1415.91181arXiv1604.08379OpenAlexW2463277343MaRDI QIDQ2411515

Yan Long, Tridib Sharma, Debasis Mishra

Publication date: 24 October 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.08379

zbMATH Keywords

budget-balanced mechanismsGreen-Laffont mechanismPareto optimal mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects ⋮ Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects ⋮ A simple budget-balanced mechanism ⋮ Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals

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