Modularity and greed in double auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.008zbMath1415.91136OpenAlexW2731405383MaRDI QIDQ2411517

Tim Roughgarden, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Publication date: 24 October 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83199/

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designdouble auctionsdeferred-acceptance auctionstrade reduction mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)

Related Items

Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems ⋮ Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ Cost sharing in two-sided markets ⋮ Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets ⋮ Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading ⋮ Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets ⋮ Revenue Maximization for Market Intermediation with Correlated Priors ⋮ Evolutionary investors' power-based game on networks

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