Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.004zbMath1415.91237OpenAlexW3124552983MaRDI QIDQ2411518

Gabrielle Demange

Publication date: 24 October 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

interactionsattentiondiffusionnetworksimpacttargetingcomplementarities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (8)

The limit of targeting in networks ⋮ Targeting the key player: an incentive-based approach ⋮ Cooperative advertising in social networks with positive externalities ⋮ Multi-activity influence and intervention ⋮ Targeting in networks under costly agreements ⋮ Targeting in social networks with anonymized information ⋮ STRUCTURAL INTERVENTIONS IN NETWORKS ⋮ Group targeting under networked synergies

Cites Work

• Competing for customers in a social network
• On the private provision of public goods on networks
• Network games under strategic complementarities
• Pricing in social networks
• A new status index derived from sociometric analysis
• Systemic Risk in Financial Systems
• Optimal Pricing in Networks with Externalities
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Contagion

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