Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.011zbMath1415.91178OpenAlexW2751489129MaRDI QIDQ2411533

Publication date: 24 October 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/146446/7/146446.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

worst-case analysis constrained equal awards rule claims problem Talmud rule guarantee structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects

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