Strengthening the security of authenticated key exchange against bad randomness

DOI10.1007/s10623-017-0337-5zbMath1426.94096OpenAlexW2588528865MaRDI QIDQ2413007

Michèle Feltz, C. J. F. Cremers

Publication date: 6 April 2018

Published in: Designs, Codes and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:909107fa-62b5-41d2-aeda-98fc7a697290

zbMATH Keywords

security modelsauthenticated key exchange (AKE)chosen randomnessstateful protocolsstateless protocols

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Related Items (1)

Strengthening the security of authenticated key exchange against bad randomness

Uses Software

• HMQV
• NAXOS

Cites Work

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• Beyond eCK: perfect forward secrecy under actor compromise and ephemeral-key reveal
• The random oracle model: a twenty-year retrospective
• Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS
• Strengthening the security of authenticated key exchange against bad randomness
• Dual EC: A Standardized Back Door
• Nonce-Based Cryptography: Retaining Security When Randomness Fails
• Public Keys
• ASICS: Authenticated Key Exchange Security Incorporating Certification Systems
• Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange
• How to Encrypt with a Malicious Random Number Generator
• Hedged Public-Key Encryption: How to Protect against Bad Randomness
• Key agreement protocols and their security analysis
• Resettable Public-Key Encryption: How to Encrypt on a Virtual Machine
• HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol
• Examining Indistinguishability-Based Proof Models for Key Establishment Protocols

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