Coaction versus reciprocity in continuous-time models of cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.03.019zbMath1412.91015OpenAlexW2162404095WikidataQ39210900 ScholiaQ39210900MaRDI QIDQ2415543

Thomas Riebli, G. Sander van Doorn, Michael Taborsky

Publication date: 23 May 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.03.019

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorysocial dilemmascooperative coordinationinformation transferreciprocal altruism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (1)

Evolution of cooperation in Axelrod tournament using cellular automata

Cites Work

• Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust
• Information, variance and cooperation: minimal models
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The dynamical theory of coevolution: A derivation from stochastic ecological processes
• Learning dynamics in social dilemmas
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project

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