Sanctions as honest signals -- the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2014.04.019zbMath1412.91012OpenAlexW2067354545WikidataQ33906547 ScholiaQ33906547MaRDI QIDQ2415549

Arne Traulsen, Sarah Schoenmakers, Christian Hilbe, Bernd Blasius

Publication date: 23 May 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.04.019

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of cooperationpublic goods gametragedy of the commonsinstitution formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (20)

Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment ⋮ Benefits of intervention in spatial public goods games ⋮ Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games ⋮ Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods ⋮ Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment: its evolution ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game ⋮ The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay ⋮ Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with stochastic opting-out ⋮ Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory ⋮ The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ Particle swarm intelligence and the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with punishment ⋮ Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of a 3-strategy game: cooperator, defector and costly cooperative loner strategic types ⋮ Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation ⋮ Complex traffic flow that allows as well as hampers lane-changing intrinsically contains social-dilemma structures ⋮ Synergy and discount of punishment in the public goods game ⋮ Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation

Cites Work

• Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
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• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
• Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
• Imitation processes with small mutations
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• The Calculus of Selfishness

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