Optimal conservatism and collective monetary policymaking under uncertainty

DOI10.1007/S11079-014-9329-5zbMath1412.91163OpenAlexW2014205851MaRDI QIDQ2416120

Carsten Hefeker, Blandine Zimmer

Publication date: 23 May 2019

Published in: Open Economies Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp4933.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

min-maxcentral bank conservatismcentral bank transparencymonetary policy committees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• Uncertainty and fiscal policy in an asymmetric monetary union
• Imperfect transparency and shifts in the central bank's output gap target
• Robust monetary policy, optimal delegation and misspecified potential output
• Robust estimation and control under commitment
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
• Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?^*
• Robustness

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