Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.005zbMath1411.91069OpenAlexW2912953280WikidataQ128416968 ScholiaQ128416968MaRDI QIDQ2416629

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:607

zbMATH Keywords

self-confirming equilibriumsmooth ambiguitysequential games with feedback

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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