Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.015zbMath1411.91417OpenAlexW2921329204WikidataQ128222647 ScholiaQ128222647MaRDI QIDQ2416641

Itai Ashlagi, Assaf Romm, Afshin Nikzad

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.015

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingdeferred acceptanceschool choicetie-breaking rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Constrained school choice
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• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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