Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: money ain't no good

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.014zbMath1411.91262OpenAlexW3023213847WikidataQ128243351 ScholiaQ128243351MaRDI QIDQ2416643

Agnieszka A. Tymula, Antonio Rosato

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econ-wpseries.com/2016/201609.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversionexpectationsauctionsreference-dependent preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• On the validity of the random lottery incentive system
• The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
• Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
• Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments
• The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
• A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
• Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
• Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty
• A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

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