Dual sourcing with price discovery
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Publication:2416645
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.007zbMath1411.91251OpenAlexW3122542325WikidataQ128133772 ScholiaQ128133772MaRDI QIDQ2416645
Publication date: 24 May 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/90429
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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