On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.03.008zbMath1411.91256OpenAlexW2932990996MaRDI QIDQ2416647

Domenico Menicucci, Doh-Shin Jeon

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

common agencybuyer powerbuyer groupcompetition in nonlinear tariffsdiscriminatory offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
• Buyer groups as strategic commitments
• Why do larger buyers pay lower prices? Intense supplier competition
• A group bargaining solution
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Games Played Through Agents

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