Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2019.02.007zbMath1412.91073OpenAlexW2802491535MaRDI QIDQ2416793

Yaping Shan

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/121699

zbMATH Keywords

R\&Ddynamic contractperformance-vesting provisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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