A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
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Publication:2417092
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2017.12.006OpenAlexW2776200353MaRDI QIDQ2417092
Publication date: 11 June 2019
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.12.006
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