Electronic service matching: failure of incentive compatibility in vickrey auctions

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2018.03.004OpenAlexW2793196534MaRDI QIDQ2417158

Tobias Widmer, Joerg Leukel

Publication date: 11 June 2019

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2018.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

pricingmechanism designelectronic servicesdouble-sided marketsvickrey auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money
• Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality
• On a modification of the VCG mechanism and its optimality
• Trading grid services - a multi-attribute combinatorial approach
• OR and the management of electronic services
• Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
• Assortative Matching and Search

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