Discriminatory power and pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the lottery blotto game

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2018.05.004OpenAlexW2803931294WikidataQ129741709 ScholiaQ129741709MaRDI QIDQ2417181

Junjie Zhou, Jin Xu

Publication date: 11 June 2019

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2018.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

existencepure strategy Nash equilibriumdiscriminatory powerlottery blotto game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Related Items (4)

A Tullock-contest-based approach for cyber security investments ⋮ Competition for networked agents in the lottery Blotto game ⋮ Dynamic contest model with bounded rationality ⋮ Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in 2-contestant generalized lottery Colonel Blotto games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• An asymmetric lottery Blotto game with a possible budget surplus and incomplete information
• Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power
• The lottery Blotto game
• The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests

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