Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
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Publication:2417370
DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1126-4zbMath1410.91189arXiv1602.08687OpenAlexW2289435862WikidataQ62039051 ScholiaQ62039051MaRDI QIDQ2417370
Nimrod Talmon, Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii M. Slinko
Publication date: 12 June 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.08687
committee scoring rulesfixed-majority criterionmultiwinner analogues of single-winner plurality rule
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Uses Software
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