The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2417399
DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1143-3zbMath1410.91034OpenAlexW2883629260MaRDI QIDQ2417399
Publication date: 12 June 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1143-3
Related Items (5)
The in-group egalitarian Owen values ⋮ Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games ⋮ A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size ⋮ Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism ⋮ Marginalism, egalitarianism and efficiency in multi-choice games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
- Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom
- Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- On weighted Shapley values
- The proportional solution for rights problems
- On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values
- A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- Differentially monotonic redistribution of income
- Weak differential monotonicity, flat tax, and basic income
- On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
- Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
- The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
- Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: A case for proportional taxation
- Monotonic Redistribution: Reconciling Performance-Based Allocation and Weighted Division
This page was built for publication: The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values