Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
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Publication:2417403
DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1148-yzbMath1410.91210OpenAlexW2892539133MaRDI QIDQ2417403
Stefano Vannucci, Ernesto Savaglio
Publication date: 12 June 2019
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1148-y
aggregation rulebounded distributive latticesingle peakednessindividual and coalitional strategy-proofness
Related Items (4)
Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences ⋮ ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS ⋮ A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling ⋮ Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization
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