Public goods with ambiguity in large economies

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.007zbMath1410.91228OpenAlexW2943303260WikidataQ127954447 ScholiaQ127954447MaRDI QIDQ2419596

Yangwei Song, Narayana R. Kocherlakota

Publication date: 14 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.007

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsambiguity aversionlarge economiesefficient provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (1)

Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence

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