HYPE: a system of hyperintensional logic (with an application to semantic paradoxes)

DOI10.1007/s10992-018-9467-0zbMath1457.03057OpenAlexW2839780276MaRDI QIDQ2421517

Hannes Leitgeb

Publication date: 17 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9467-0

zbMATH Keywords

semantic paradoxesintuitionistic logicparaconsistent logicclutterstruthmaker semanticshyperintensional

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other nonclassical logic (03B60) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items

Routley star and hyperintensionality ⋮ A more unified approach to free logics ⋮ Sequent calculi for the propositional logic of HYPE ⋮ A semantics for hyperintensional belief revision based on information bases ⋮ NONCLASSICAL TRUTH WITH CLASSICAL STRENGTH. A PROOF-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF COMPOSITIONAL TRUTH OVER HYPE ⋮ Towards a Logic of Value and Disagreement via Imprecise Measures ⋮ Qualitative reasoning in a two-layered framework ⋮ Logics of synonymy ⋮ THE LOGIC OF HYPERLOGIC. PART A: FOUNDATIONS ⋮ Conjunctive paraconsistency ⋮ PROOF SYSTEMS FOR EXACT ENTAILMENT ⋮ Some remarks on semantics and expressiveness of the sentential calculus with identity ⋮ A modal loosely guarded fragment of second-order propositional modal logic ⋮ Logic talk ⋮ Hyperintensional logics for everyone ⋮ Meaning-preserving translations of non-classical logics into classical logic: between pluralism and monism ⋮ THE LOGIC OF INFORMATION IN STATE SPACES ⋮ Toward a generalization of the logic of grounding ⋮ Paraconsistent Gödel modal logic

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